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"historic patterns of water use." Therefore, the fact that this particular use of
the Bateman Ditch was no longer part of any claim in the water adjudication
process did not preclude recognition of the practice. Additionally, the Court
noted that while the Bateman Ditch diversion was not an exchange plan, it was
"typical of historic arrangements" made throughout the area in order to obtain
maximum benefit from a limited resource. The Bateman Ditch was a typical
tool used by administrafors as a conservation measure. The Court disagreed,
however, with the Water Court's conclusion that the Bateman Ditch diversion
was a private right held by Saylor. In so concluding, the Court explained that
Saylor did not possess a right or duty to administer the water rights of others.
Rather, the administration of these rights was a management tool available only to the District Court and its Water Commissioner.
Subsequently, the Court concluded that the Water Court acted properly
in listing the water rights that could be diverted through the Bateman Ditch.
The Lower Users objected, arguing that Choteau Cattle's right was improperly
listed because Choteau Cattle had specifically removed the Bateman Ditch as
a point of diversion for its right. Additionally, the Lower Users argued that
during the water adjudication process Saylor filed to claim the right to use
Batemnan Ditch to supply Choteau Cattle's right. The Court explained that
because the use of Bateman Ditch to deliver water to Choteau Cattle was a
management tool and not a right personal to Saylor, it was unnecessary for
Saylor to have claimed the right in the adjudication process. It therefore concluded that the Water Court properly listed Choteau Cattle's right as one diverted from the Bateman Ditch.
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Water Court's decision in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the Water Court for further proceedings.

Neilie Fields
Marks v. 71 Ranch, LP, 334 P.3d 373 (Mont. 2014) (holding that (i) water
colmnissioner records of low water supply levels had little probative value regarding whether claimant applied water right to beneficial use; (ii) testimony
that different portions of a creek constituted separate water sources was insufficient to overcome a prior court decree describing the creek as a single, unified system; and (iii) standing alone, water commissioner records of insufficient delivery did not prove abandonment).
In 1940, Wellington Rankin acquired a decree ("Rmki'n Decree") to four
water rights (the. "creek rights") located on Confederate Creek. Rankin's
rights had a priority date of 1866 and a combined flow rate of 385 miner's
inches. The Rankin Decree described Confederate Creek as a single, unified
water system. It also identified a point of diversion and place of use located
on the lower part of the creek ("downstream location"). In 1950, Rankin sold
the property surrounding the downstream location. However, Rankin properly severed and maintained ownership of the creek rights. In 1982, Louise R.
Galt, Rankin's successor in interest and 71 Ranch's predecessor in interest,
filed Statements of Claim for the creek rights. The Statements of Claim described a new point of diversion and place of use roughly three miles upstream from the original diversion point ("upstream location"). Objector ind
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appellant Donald C. Marks owned property and water rights between the
claimed upstream and old downstream locations. Marks's rights were junior
to the creek rights.
Marks liled an objection to the creek rights' new place of use and point of
diversion. The Water Master dismissed Marks's objection in 2002 and the
Water Court aflirmed the dismissal. Both determined that Marks had failed
to rebut the prima facie evidence that Galt's claims properly defined the point
of diversion and place of use for the creek rights at the upstream location.
Marks's appeal thus came to the Supreme Court of Montana ("Court") to
consider whether the Water Court erred in its determination. In Montana,
prior to July 1, 1973, an appropriator could change the point of diversion and
place of use of its water right as long as the appropriator beneficially used the
right at the new place of use mad did not injure any other appropriators. Under Montana law, a claim of right is prima facie proof of its content mad places
the burden of proof on the claim's objector to prove, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that the original claim misrepresented the actual beneficial use
of the water right prior to July 1, 1973.
Thus, Marks had to prove that the information in Galt's Statement of
Claim was inaccurate. Marks offered three theories: (i) the creek rights were
not beneficially used at the upstream location prior to July 1, 1973; (ii) the upper and lower portion of Confederate Creek were separate water sources; and
(iii) Rankin and Galt had abandoned the water rights.
To support his first argument, Marks provided records indicating that on
certain days water flow was less than the Rankin Decree dictated. Marks used
this infornation to argue that, if Rankin mad Galt had beneficially used their
creek rights, more water would have flowed to the upstream location of the
creek rights. The Water Master observed that the records did not indicate the
total water flow, made no mention of diversions during high flows, did not describe stream flow conditions, and did not disclose whether anyone ever requested more water. The Water Master also noted that water commissioners
were generally only appointed in times of water shortage. The Court concluded that, given these facts, it was reasonable to assume that Marks's records
only reflected measurements of low flow years. Given the lack of any data for
several multi-year periods, the Court found that the Water Master did not err
in determining these records provided minimal probative value regarding the
question of beneficial use during the disputed decades.
The Court then addressed Marks's second argument. Marks argued there
were separate water sources for the upper and lower portions of the creek. In
support of his claim, Marks testified as to the division of the two portions, and
introduced the testimony of the 2002 water commissioner. However, the
commissioner's testimony conflicted somewhat with Marks' own testimony.
Specifically, Marks claimed one particular area would dry up in the summer
months, while the water commissioner conceded that water did flow past the
area during the spring flood season. The Court considered the conflicting testimonies and noted that Marks failed to present any evidence from anyone
famniliar with the conditions of the Creek prior to 1973. The Court further
noted that the Ramkin Decree described the creek as a single, unified water
system. Emphasizing that a "decree of a court stands as an absolute finality"
and that Marks had failed to provide reliable evidence to rebut the decree, the
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Court affirmied the Water Master's lindings that the two portions of the creek
did not constitute separate sources.
Finally, the Court addressed Marks's abandonment argument. To support this contention, Marks relied on the sane evidence he had provided for
his first assertion. Specificaly, he used the water commissioner's reports of
insufficient water flow to claim that Rankin and Galt failed to beneficially use
their rights. From this argument, Marks drew the conclusion that Rankin and
Galt had eflectively abandoned their rights by allowing them to lie dormant for
over twenty years. Relying on the previous decision that, standing alone, the
water commissioner records failed to prove non-use, the Court determined
that Marks's argument for abandonment failed.
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Water Court's dismissal of Marks's
objection.
Kaly Riankin

NEBRASKA
Weber v. N. Loup River Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist., 854 N.W.2d 263
(Neb. 2014) (holding that the district court properly granted the defendant's
motion for summary judgment because (i) the plaintifl's' failure to pay irrigation charges was a condition precedent to the defendant's contractual duty to
deliver water to the plaintiffs' land; (ii) the defendant did not waive the condition precedent when it waived tie irrigation fees for one newly-contracted tract
of land; (iii) the defendant did not anticipatorily breach the contracts because
the plaintiffs had already materially breached the contract through nonpayment; and (iv) the defendant was not negligent in its delivery of tie water to
the plaintiffs because the plaintiffs' prior breach of the contracts relieved the
defendant of any preexisting duty).
North Loup River Public Power and Irrigation District ("North Loup")
manages an irrigation system with many diversion dams and canals, including
the Taylor-Ord Canal ("Canal"), which originates at the Taylor Diversion
Dam ("Dam"). William and Dixie Weber ("the Webers") held eight contracts with North Loup to irrigate their farmland from the Canal. The contracts stated that North Loup would provide water during the irrigation season
to the Webers' land for $2.50 per acre. The Webers were to pay for their water by the first of December the year preceding the irrigation season. The
contracts also stated that North Loup would withhold delivery of the water if
the Webers failed to pay within four months of that date.
In June 2010 the North Loup River experienced an uncommon anount
of rainfall and flooding. On June 11, 2010, the flood completely destroyed
the Dam and severely damaged the Canal. North Loup determined that the
Dam was "beyond repair" and decided to rebuild a permanent dam. The
landowners with contracts for irrigation water received no water that year due
to the damnage.
The Webers' bill for the 2010 irrigation season was due December 1,
2009. At the time of the flood in June 2010, the Webers still had not paid
their bill. The Webers finally paid their bill on April 13, 2011, but they did so
"under protest." In December 2011 the Webers filed a complaint against

